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 THE  ‘ IRON CAGE ’ STRENGTHENED? 
DISCRETION AND DIGITAL DISCIPLINE 
 FRANS  JORNA  AND  PIETER  WAGENAAR 
 Research on changes in public administration associated with the adoption and use 
of information and communication technologies ( ‘ informatization ’ ), almost univo-
cally supports the conclusion that shop fl oor discretion disappears under their infl u-
ence. We, however, are ill at ease with this direction in thought about discretion. 
Our unease is based on the scholarly work about practices, organizational learning 
and responsiveness. In this article, we test the thesis on the relation between infor-
matization and operational discretion in an empirical research of operational discre-
tion and informatization in two Dutch public agencies, both large and both 
automated. Our fi ndings show that informatization does not destroy operational 
discretion, but rather obscures discretion. Based on the work of Argyris, we show 
that the phenomenon at work is  ‘ participatory boundary practices ’ , the direct per-
sonal ties that keep an organization together. ICTs destroy such links and thereby 
affect organizational learning. 
 INTRODUCTION 
 ‘ Reinvented ’ bureaucracy is widely argued to have thrown off the shackles 
so characteristic of its  ‘ Weberian ’ prototype. The strict discipline of hierar-
chies has, according to this argument, given way to new forms of organiza-
tion based on fl exibility, responsiveness and marketization ( Osborne and 
Gaebler 1993 ). However, the above argument fails to account for the fact that 
technological progress has also increased the possibility for introducing 
greater hierarchical discipline into public organizations. The growing use of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) within government  – 
from the national implementation of systems for social security payments to 
the local databases available to advisers in employment exchanges  – have 
the potential of substantially reducing, if not totally eliminating, the exercise 
of discretion by offi cials. 
 Street-level bureaucrats were generally regarded, not too long ago, as 
exercising a great amount of discretion in their dealings with the public 
( Lipsky 1980 ). But nowadays, scholarly orthodoxy has it, street-level bureau-
crats in diverse locations can be constrained and guided by a single software 
programme that has prescribed procedures to ensure programmed outcomes 
( Franken 1993; Zuurmond 1994; Zeef 1994; Van de Donk 1997; Zouridis 
2000 ). The use of discretion is now generally limited to the designers of these 
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systems, known as  ‘ system-level experts ’ , leaving the users, known as 
 ‘ screen-level workers ’ , with little to no administrative freedom ( Bovens and 
Zouridis 2002 ). 
 A new control system has emerged to replace Weber ’ s  ‘ iron cage ’ : 
Zuurmond ’ s  ‘ virtual fortress ’ . The old bureaucratic mechanisms to keep 
operators in check have been replaced by electronic surveillance and con-
straints. Information systems not only ensure control over the actions of 
employees, they also put limits on their thoughts. Through this electronic 
control, the  ‘ masters ’ of an organization can determine what is seen as fact 
(as data) and what is not seen at all ( Zuurmond 1994 , pp. 304, 328). Thus, 
even though the screen-level bureaucracy still retains human operators, they 
have been turned into near robots. Such organizations are similar to Zouridis ’ 
 ‘ information refi nery ’ where information is processed on a continuous basis 
and operators have disappeared altogether. They are replaced by complex 
machines and a handful of expert operators who guarantee that the 
machines function smoothly ( Zouridis 2000 , pp. 307 – 8). 
 The mainstream of research on ICTs confi rms the hypothesis that ICTs 
reinforce the  status quo ( Danziger and Andersen 2002 ). They are powerful 
tools in the hands of top management. Through electronic management 
information systems (MIS), managers monitor the way operators handle 
information. By automatically assigning workloads, by using automatic 
forms to complete before closing a case, by funnelling information through 
expert systems, managers gain increasing control over work processes. One 
more step and the human factor is eliminated altogether. The information 
fed into the machinery is standardized to such an extent that it can be 
handled automatically. Operators disappear from the shop fl oor. A new 
class takes the stage: system designers and supervisors that watch over the 
production processes. Administrative agencies then become decision facto-
ries where decisions are produced, not crafted ( Zouridis 2000 ). 
 Although the previous arguments are appealing and deemed as common 
sense, they have not been extensively subjected to empirical analysis. Just 
as we cannot assume that organizations behave exactly according to their 
formal rules, we cannot simply assume that a software programme defi nes 
the essential elements of an operation in a public service delivery organiza-
tion. A central tenet of organizational sociology is that rules do not operate 
in isolation from the norms and cultures of those working in an organization. 
 Gouldner (1955) , for example, in his study of a gypsum plant, shows how 
punitive rules become bargaining tools for both superiors and subordinates. 
 Crozier (1964) argues that the  ‘ resistance of the human means ’ to hierarchi-
cal rules is a universal feature of any bureaucratic organization, and the form 
of this resistance shapes its distinctive bureaucratic culture. Paper rules have 
not eliminated discretion from bureaucracies. This leads us to our main ques-
tion: are rules that are reinforced by ICT systems any different? 
 To answer this question, we looked at the operation of two government 
programmes in The Netherlands that require individualized public service 
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delivery on a mass basis  – the handling of applications for housing subsidies 
and the administration of farming subsidy regulations, the Mac Sharry regu-
lations. We then proceed as outlined below. First, we fi nd out how opera-
tors that are  ‘ only data processors ’ wield discretion. Second, we look into 
the way such operators are controlled. Third, we investigate how ICTs infl u-
ence such control. Fourth, we design a framework for studying the use of 
discretion in public administration, narrowing our focus to administration 
on a mass basis. Finally, we develop two hypotheses presented in a heuristic 
model and make that model operational for a comparative case study. This 
case study presented in the two sections that follow the hypotheses, is the 
thrust of our article. We present our conclusions in the fi nal section. 
 MASS ADMINISTRATION 
 Discretion 
 The welfare state is built upon decision factories. Taxation, welfare, unem-
ployment benefi ts and grants are targeted at hundreds of thousands of citi-
zens. To cope with the administrative complexity both of high ambitions and 
the great number of entitlements, government develops intricate arrays of 
decision rules that form the basis for both legislation and administration 
( Schokker 1996 ). These organizational schemes are result-oriented rather 
than process-oriented: they are intended to process forms. Nevertheless, the 
programmes are still operated by people. They process information-sheets 
into digital data, correct mistakes, fi ll in blanks, retrieve data to compare new 
information with and work pieces of information into decisions ( Lenk 1998 ). 
 Most authors assume that such process-oriented schemes limit discretion. 
That assumption is due to a bias in the literature on implementation and 
administration that focuses on processes of adjudication, where formal 
expertise is involved (Weber ’ s  Fachwissen ). Another element of knowledge 
that is just as important as formal expertise is practical knowledge (Weber ’ s 
 Dienstwissen ): knowing how to best sort and route information. 
 Practices 
 Operators need discretion in their work. The application of public law in-
volves balancing public ends with private interests: equality before the law 
while at the same time taking individual circumstances into consideration 
( Denhardt 1984 , pp. 153 – 4). Administrative reasoning, fi nding out what is 
reasonable in a given situation, is the process of individualizing public law. 
For this, civil servants use discretion ( Kagan 1978 , pp. 85 – 99). 
 Administrative reasoning does not occur in a vacuum.  ‘ Screen-level ’ bureau-
crats are members of groups that sustain particular  ‘ ways of operating ’ . The 
literature has various names for this phenomenon:  ‘ implementation-style ’ 
( Goggin  et al. 1990 ),  ‘ standard operating procedures ’ ( Allison 1971 ) or  ‘ modes 
of reasoning ’ ( Kagan 1978 ). It is precisely this  ‘ way of operating ’ that fi lls the 
gap between rules and application, between law and administrative practice. 
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 Operators engage in administrative reasoning by processing data. Knowing 
how to put meaning on these data requires socialization in the shared stand-
ards which guide the operators in their work. Such standards are only 
learned  ‘ in practice ’ from colleagues ( Wenger 1998; Seely Brown and Duguid 
2000 ). Mac Intyre refers to such group processes as  ‘ practices ’ : 
 any coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative 
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are 
realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence 
which are appropriate to, and partially defi nitive of, that form of activity. 
( MacIntyre 1985 , p. 187) 
 Practicing the  ‘ Rechtsstaat ’ 
 Applying rules to cases involves multiple practices. The operator practice 
does not exist in a vacuum. The cases operators process, the complaints they 
deal with, the new routines they are commissioned to carry out, all of their 
work, originates from somewhere outside their operational practice: from 
neighbouring practices and/or from the daily practice of public law. We 
refer to that system as  ‘ the Rechtsstaat ’ . In the Rechtsstaat, every administra-
tive action follows from a law and is monitored by parliament and the court 
system (Zamboni 2001). The Rechtsstaat consists of multiple practices: leg-
islating, implementation, regulating through policies, the application of 
rules, administrative review and appeal. Each of these practices represents 
a world on its own. We map these practices (see  table  1) by distinguishing 
between two forms of specialization: horizontal and vertical ( Dunsire 1978 ). 
In the horizontal dimension there are three  ‘ domains ’ : the design of rules 
( ‘ design ’ ), the application of rules ( ‘ administration ’ ) and the adaptation of 
rules ( ‘ review ’ ). The vertical dimension is similarly structured in four levels: 
the constitutional level of laws and by-laws; the level of policy and organi-
zational routines; and the level of individualization, in which rules are fi tted 
to cases. Each of the cells in the table constitutes a practice. 
 TABLE  1  Practising the  ‘ Rechtstaat ’ 
 Domain level  Design  Administration  Review 
 Law Legislator Parliamentary scrutiny Court system/ 
 appeal procedures Appeal procedures 
 Policy Policy design/
 policy staff
Political-administrative 
 apex
Legal department/ 
 legislative staff 
 Organizational 
routines 
Policy design/
 procedures
Middle 
 management
Legislative 
 department/ 
 legal consulting 
 Decisions Internal procedural 
 control
 Operators: information 
 processing 
Legal consulting/
 administrative 
 redress Administrative 
  content 
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 Boundary practices and control 
 The operational practice of crafting decisions in individual cases is only one 
practice of many. It has boundaries with fi ve other practices. In order to 
perform, operators have to cooperate with members of each of these fi ve 
practices. Their work has to be: monitored by legal advisors; circumscribed 
by policy designers; steered by middle and senior managers; subjected to 
appeal procedures in administrative courts; and checked through internal 
administrative review procedures. The question is: how do these practices 
work together? 
 On the boundaries between practices, arrangements arise: sets of transla-
tions, codices of meaning such as shared documents, or tacit understandings. 
A communal language or, rather, a  lingua franca, comes into being that allows 
managers and operators, operators and controllers, legal advisors and 
operators to interact and communicate meaningfully. Argyris distinguishes 
between two devices that can connect practices:  ‘ artefacts ’ and  ‘ participatory 
boundary practices ’ . Artefacts are non-human information carriers such as 
work instructions or automated MIS ‘ s; participatory boundary practices con-
sist of human beings ( Argyris 1994 , pp. 161 – 72). 
 Our focus is on the exercise of discretion by operators, the way that exer-
cise is infl uenced by other practices, and the changes informatization induces 
in these relations. The general feeling is that informatization leads to the 
integration and harmonization between the various practices making direct 
control and monitoring obsolete. The classic problem with discretion is con-
trol: verifying exactly what operators do in terms of  ‘ added value ’ is diffi cult. 
One can verify the outcome (the routing), but not the input. Individualization, 
that central tenet of the Rechtsstaat, implies that inductive processes occur 
that interpret the law in view of individual circumstances, and vice versa. 
Most bureaucracies rely on strict procedural instructions and control. 
Procedural control, however, has a tendency to actually increase discretion 
when complexity increases. The causes may vary: because of the workload, 
administrative ambitions, accumulation of administrative rules, and so on 
( Wilson 1989 , pp. 36 – 44). 
 Generally, the solution is to isolate processors from both the outside world 
and substantive processing, to enforce strict operational procedures, and to 
monitor. ICTs are a tremendous asset in this striving for control ( Zuurmond 
1994 ). The quality of the work fed into the operational process  – letters, 
claims, applications, and phone calls  – is controlled eliminating any room 
for interpretation. Processors are restricted to using internal, formal sources 
for labelling. This is seen in many aspects of the organisation. A front desk 
is installed to answer phone calls so that actual operators are not confronted 
by anything that might challenge the validity of standard procedures and 
internal information. Forms and fact sheets are used to reduce qualitative 
information into quantitative data  – uniform codes that leave no room for 
interpretation. Double checks ensure that each entry of a form and each 
process of labelling is performed twice. The ultimate goal of this rigorous 
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standardisation is to squeeze interpretation out of the administrative process 
and render it  ‘ automatable ’ ( Zouridis 2000 , pp. 305 – 6). 
 We label the above strategy as  ‘ departicipation ’ : the organizational life and 
communication within operational practice is restricted to an absolute mini-
mum. Animate instruments that enable operators to form practices, such as 
case discussions, are replaced by inanimate artefacts, such as the review of 
an online expert system. Thus, the focus of operators is shifted away from 
actual practice to formal norms, while the fl ow of information from outside 
the practice is intensifi ed. Information systems produce arguments and data 
so intricate that operators can no longer evaluate them. At the same time, 
automated MIS ’ s monitor the ways operators handle information. The com-
bination of automated databases with automated systems that handle data 
and electronic MIS ’ s are the primary tools of management control over 
operators  – or so it seems ( Zuurmond 1998 ). 
 But is this really the case? In a seminal article, Argyris describes how MIS ’ s 
spanning the entire organization can actually lead to organizational disinte-
gration ( Argyris 1994 , pp. 115 – 30). An MIS delivers highly detailed insights 
into the organizational lives of operators that we can benefi t from. The art 
of management, in Argyris ’ opinion, is to know both under what conditions 
and how management information is produced. Higher management, 
Argyris found, is often not aware of these circumstances because it does not 
participate in the operators ’ world. Participation is necessary to evaluate 
information and ascertain its meaning. As discussed above, management 
practice is connected with operator practice through two devices:  ‘ artefacts ’ 
and  ‘ participatory boundary practices ’ . Replacing participatory instruments 
with artefacts, which is what relying on a MIS exclusively boils down to, is 
therefore a high-risk operation. It can instigate organizational disintegration 
because management is no longer able to evaluate the meaning of manage-
ment information. Wenger has elegantly demonstrated how this thesis 
applies even to routine processing organizations such as the claims proces-
sing sections of large insurance corporations ( Wenger 1998 , pp. 18 – 34). 
 ICTs and discretion: a hypothesis 
 As this article makes clear, we have reservations about the thesis that the use 
of ICTs drives out discretion. We believe that the use of ICTs actually rein-
forces the material linkages between practices. The use of ICTs, we think, 
boosts effective management control over the material aspect of processing 
information. This process, however, is accompanied by a decrease in mana-
gerial participation in operational practices, the actual communication 
between managers and the operators they manage. ICTs lead, with standard-
ization, to an increase in management information and to the enforcement 
of formal procedures. This increase in management control, however, 
is virtual. By increasing the number of artefacts used to control operational 
discretion, managers become further detached from what really happens. 
Hence, to fi nally present our hypothesis, ICTs do not drive out discretion. 
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They limit management control to the formal aspects of organizational life 
and obscure the informal aspects such as the use of discretion. 
 We base this thesis fi rst and foremost on the work of Argyris who points 
to the signifi cance of participation and gives evidence of what happens when 
the use of MIS ’ s crowds out human interaction. According to Argyris, con-
trolling discretion implies relying on participation, for what one does not 
know through personal experience, one can never know fully, and therefore 
cannot control. The use of MIS ’ s focuses management control on specifi c 
points at the expense of less visible, tangible elements of administration 
such as labelling and routing. They also obscure discretion ( Argyris 1994 , 
pp. 115 – 30). 
 ICTs are strong tools. They standardize informal elements into a coher-
ently organized logical set of formal requirements, both procedural and 
substantive. The material element in the relation between managers and 
operators is reinforced by ICTs. Yet, for an organization to function effec-
tively, participation and artefacts must be in balance. To frame the argument 
in terms of operational discretion and management control: the adoption and 
further integration of ICTs must be accompanied by an increase in participa-
tion, the communication between managers and operators. 
 To our knowledge, this line of reasoning has not been pursued suffi ciently. 
In their survey of the informatization literature,  Danziger and Andersen 
(2002) report mixed effects of ICTs on management control. Out of the 24 
articles between 1987 and 2000 dealing with ICT impact on organizational 
control, 67 per cent report positive effects and 17 per cent negative effects. 
We believe these variations are largely explained by distinguishing between 
the effects of ICTs on the material aspects of organizational life (artefacts) 
and the participatory elements. As no study has hitherto mapped the ways 
in which the use of ICTs affects this relation, the effects of ICTs have in all 
probability, we suggest, been misunderstood. 
 Comparative case study 
 Tracing how ICTs affect the use of discretion requires detailed empirical 
analysis of work processes ( Zouridis 2000 , p. 81). To this end, we have 
selected two programmes that employ ICTs to deliver tailored administra-
tion on claims, grants and subsidies on a mass basis. We made our selection 
on the assumption that mass scale programmes minimize operational discre-
tion and are easier to  ‘ informatize ’ than programmes that produce individu-
alized adjudication of claims, such as state subsidies for innovative projects. 
Mass scale, fully standardized programmes are comparable to Wenger ’ s 
claims processing unit. If any type of programme is prone to automating 
control and rooting out discretion, it is here. If administration can do without 
management participation in the operators ’ domain, it is here. If ICTs can be 
relied upon to effectively control the operational core, it is with mass scale, 
fully standardized administration of public claims. 
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 In his empirical appendix to an essay about the effects of IT on the imple-
mentation of legal programmes, Snellen lists and briefl y characterizes all the 
programmes in Dutch central government that, at least partially, employ 
computer systems for the administrative process ( Snellen 1993 ). Only four 
of these involve a discretionary element: taxation (various types), the Housing 
Subsidies Act, the Mac Sharry subventions to farmers, and the military draft. 
Taxation has been subject to intensive research and the military draft no 
longer exists. 
 To test our assumption, therefore, we have chosen the Mac Sharry subven-
tions and housing subsidies. The agencies that carry out these programmes, 
LASER and HIS respectively, follow different strategies in dealing with op-
erational discretion. HIS, the ministry of housing ’ s division for granting 
housing benefi ts, employs few participatory boundary practices. Management 
relies on an extensive set of tools to monitor and steer operators. LASER ’ s 
middle management forms part of the operational teams and maintains close 
day-to-day contact with the operators. In terms of technology, the differences 
are small. In terms of organization, they are big. Various explanations have 
been offered for this difference: the age and stage of development of the 
programmes, the administrative history and roots of the two agencies (agri-
culture and housing), and the infl uence of system designers on the legal 
programme. Yet, these organizations are comparable with respect to the way 
discretion was controlled prior to the introduction of these ICTs. They there-
fore constitute a valid comparison for a case study into how the ICTs infl u-
ence  ‘ white collar ’ discretion. The two sections that follow are devoted to 
the empirical analysis of LASER and HIS respectively. Each analysis follows 
the same route: 
 •  A brief sketch of the programme; 
 •  Identifying where and how operators have discretion; 
 •  The ICTs involved; 
 •  An analysis of how ICTs interact with discretion; 
 •  Ascertaining the effects of the adoption of ICTs on boundary practices. 
 LASER: MAC SHARRY REGULATIONS 
 The programme 
 The Mac Sharry Programme is administered by the Department of Agricul-
ture ’ s implementation and enforcement agency, LASER, which is geographi-
cally organized into fi ve regional branches: North, East, South, South-West 
and North-West. The regional units are responsible for administering all 
LASER programmes in their region. Each unit develops and monitors a 
number of programmes. Region East, where our focus lies, specializes in 
livestock subventions: premiums for keeping cows, bulls and sheep. LASER 
handles most of the Ministry of Agriculture ‘ s administrative fi nancial pro-
grammes, including the Mac Sharry subsidies. The Mac Sharry subsidies 
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are a European programme, implemented and enforced by each member 
state ’ s dedicated agency. LASER is one of the few agencies in The Nether-
lands that holds an EU-license to transfer payments to farmers (EU Transac-
tion Organ). 
 The Mac Sharry Programme on livestock requires a tailored mass admin-
istrative scheme. Each year, 76,000 applications are processed by 40 opera-
tors. This amounts to 1900 applications per operator per year, or eight 
applications per operator per day. Each application not only involves 
administrative processing, but also a three-step judgement process in which 
databases and other material sources are consulted to form a decision. 
Although the main elements of the administrative scheme appear straight-
forward, discretion is surprisingly big. An enforceable defi nition of what 
constitutes a  ‘ premiable ’ cow seems simple. Practice proves otherwise. 
Cows are administratively defi ned as a female species of the bovine races 
prevalent in the EU; but non-EU races that are imported into the EU also 
produce female species. Moreover, to become eligible for a premium, cows 
must have delivered their fi rst calf. However, not all calves are live born; 
in addition, dates of birth can vary, so that it is administratively unpredict-
able when a cow actually becomes a cow. If dates count, and they do, and 
if the agency wants to know such dates in advance, and it does, the enforce-
ment is cumbersome. Adding a strict notifi cation-duty on the receiving 
party does not really help. The line between fraud or abuse and legitimate 
neglect of administrative conditions to premiums is thin. To know the 
difference, one has to understand agriculture and the specifi c natural 
conditions that confront farmers. 
 In  table  2, we show the domains of the Rechtsstaat operational for LASER. 
In our research, we concentrated on the administration of the subventions 
to producers of livestock by the Region East division of LASER. The region 
consists of three teams with one manager each. Team One, referred to as 
 ‘ Development and Control ’ (D&C), devises the entire processing and routing 
of claims: the operational guidelines, internal procedures and alterations to 
the rules. Most of the team members have a polytechnic background, usually 
with an agricultural focus. The regulations they implement are a mirror 
 TABLE  2  Practising the  ‘ Rechtstaat ’ : LASER 
 Domain level  Design  Administration  Adaptation 
 Law EU EU, LASER HQ Court of appeal 
 Policy LASER, HQ Head LASER East Ministry of Agriculture, 
Legal Department 
 Organizational 
routines 
Team 1
 – procedures 
Manager Teams 2 and 3 Team 3, legal unit 
 Decisions Team 1
 – control
 Operators: information 
processing 
Team 3, legal unit 
 –  Team 2 (administrative) 
  –  Team 3 (content) 
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image of the way the programme is administered. The regulations are guided 
by European legislation which provides the legal norms and ground rules 
for the administrative process. 
 Teams Two and Three are the operational teams, each with about six 
members. Team Two handles the more complicated schemes and Team 
Three performs the more routine jobs. All input  – completed forms, formal 
complaints, letters, formal acts notifying LASER of the liquidation and take 
over of existing farms  – is distributed evenly among the operators and then 
processed. There is no administrative distinction between labelling and 
processing. Managers interact with their staff on a frequent basis about the 
interpretation of certain rules, the appropriateness of procedures and even 
the effectiveness of eligibility and administrative control criteria. Operators 
also frequently interact with colleagues from the D&C and the regional legal 
unit embedded in Team Three. The legal unit handles formal complaints, 
requests for administrative review, grievances, and the adaptation of 
routines in view of new case law or (inter) national regulation. 
 The operators in Team Three have a strong alliance with the legal team: 
they interact on a day-to-day basis, and senior operators share in the work-
load of the legal team and assist the legal advisors in review procedures. 
D&C, on the other hand, is relatively isolated. The natural working environ-
ment of D&C professionals consists of a national network of designers, not 
the regional unit. Their identity is linked to the entire organization, LASER, 
and the Ministry of Agriculture. The same is true for the members of the 
legal team: their identity lies in a national network of legal policy advisors 
and operators, not with the regional unit. Nonetheless, because their work 
is so closely linked and even intertwined with the operational processes, and 
because operations constitute their domain, they do associate on a daily 
basis with the operators. 
 Discretion 
 The biological reality of food-stock production does not lend itself to water-
tight procedural guidelines. As an agency administering European pro-
grammes, however, LASER is obliged to abide by strict fi nancial requirements 
in terms of enforcement, tolerance and reporting. In the world of European 
subsidies, political and administrative attention is focused on fi nancial 
irregularities, far less on programme effectiveness. 
 The natural focus of LASER ’ s management is, therefore, on procedural 
internal and external control and reporting. This contrasts with the mem-
bers ’ outlook on life. D&C, management and the operators are perfectly 
aware that their rules and criteria do not neatly mirror physical reality and 
they live in a virtual European reporting reality. To bridge this gulf between 
the practice of administration and the virtual world of reporting, operators 
are granted substantive discretion in the way they reach decisions. 
Simultaneously, management beds down fi rmly on the formal aspects of 
programme administration. 
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 The result is that LASER operates in two different worlds at the same 
time. One is obsessed with procedural control, procedural scrutiny, manage-
ment reports and tri-monthly analyses. Regional managers and the director 
squabble over the division of responsibilities. Special teams investigate the 
extent to which operators follow procedural guidelines. In the other world, 
operators handle substance in ways that procedural controls could never 
effectively check. To bridge the gap between physical and administrative 
reality, operators are given substantial freedom as to what information 
sources they use and how they organize the process of judging claims, the 
requirement being that the fi nal result conforms to formal norms and the 
data stored is stored on the basis of these norms. 
 Information and Communication(s) Technology (ICTs) 
 LASER employs a number of automated databases and applications that 
guide operators through the various primary processes. Three databases are 
crucial: 
 1.  A business registration system which holds all economic data on 
subsidized farms; 
 2.  A registration system that holds all data on the registered animals 
including their genealogy, date of birth, and owner; 
 3.  A land registration system. 
 Applications are processed by operators assisted by an automated handling 
application (ABS/AAS) consisting of three components: 
 1.  One ascertains the number of hectares of crop producing land fi led by 
an applicant; 
 2.  The second component checks the animal registration data for each 
applicant; 
 3.  The third component checks whether the applicant has also fi led for 
other grant schemes. 
 Databases are useful tools, but they are only as strong as the suppositions 
they are built upon. With LASER, administrative reality and real life are very 
different. Operators need to take care to counter-check data before they use 
it. Written instructions warn operators to use all the data available to them, 
not just the data contained in the databases. Let us consider one example. 
If tracts of land are located near a river or stream, their size is sometimes 
altered by erosion. Hence, a database that uses a recorded size of such land 
from years ago, may not accurately refl ect the current size of the land. Not 
corroborating this information could lead the operator to believe the tract of 
land is much larger or smaller than it actually is. Let us consider a further 
example. A heifer becomes a cow once it has produced its fi rstborn calf. 
The birth of a calf cannot be predicted, rendering the data on that heifer 
unreliable. Knowledge of stock-production is therefore necessary to be able 
to match information that farmers give with registration systems. 
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 Differences between registered data and new information result in an 
 ‘ inconsistency ’ . To give a further example, the cadastral plot 20786, measur-
ing 4.5 hectares, turns out to measure 6.3 hectares. In the case of such an 
inconsistency, the system will send a signal to the operator, and refuse the 
new entry of data into the computer until the inconsistency has been solved. 
This leaves the operator with two options: conforming to registered data and 
ignoring new information; or counter-checking the new piece of information, 
to see if it is valid. Operators use practical knowledge to ascertain the 
situation and decide what should be done, to change either the former reg-
istration or the new one. The operators are familiar with the conditions that 
give rise to new information. From the management perspective, it is impos-
sible to gauge what is true and not true. It is not only impossible, but unde-
sirable. Top management needs MIS ’ s to have aggregate information on 
organizational effi ciency. 
 To study the effects of the adoption and use of ICTs on operational discre-
tion, we studied the way in which the LASER ’ s Region East operational 
teams were managed between the period January 1996 to December 1998. 
Within that period, LASER went through three informatization develop-
ments: 
 1.  The introduction of the  ‘ Operation Recovery Inconsistencies Data-
bases ’ ; 
 2.  The creation of an all-encompassing Land Registry; 
 3.  The establishment of OMNIBUS, a catch-all application that forms the 
centre of all administrative and substantive operational processes. 
 The  ‘ Operation Recovery Inconsistencies Databases ’ investigates whether 
any discrepancies exist between the information farmers supply to LASER ’ s 
Business Registration System and a host of other offi cial authorities such as 
the Chamber of Commerce, the Tax Service and other central government 
agencies. Before LASER was created, every government agency collected, 
managed and used its own data with its own administrative defi nitions. At 
the end of 1995, when LASER began as a decentralized government agency, 
the data sets had to be integrated. 
 The development of nationwide Land Registry was a second major project. 
Some components of LASER used a mailcode based system. Others followed 
the Tax Service and used Chamber of Commerce registrations. As an incen-
tive to small farms and to limit administrative complexity, farmers who came 
under Mac Sharry regulations with fewer than 13 cows or bulls are allowed 
to follow a less stringent enforcement and reporting scheme, and are awarded 
small bonuses for keeping up a small farm. In agriculture, a husband and 
wife team often hold separate legal companies in order to spread (as well 
as limit) fi nancial risk. Under the Mac Sharry regulations, administrative 
attention focused on farms located at the same address. It is forbidden to 
start a farm with the sole intention of claiming a higher premium, but it is 
normal to have more than one farm at one address. Claiming lands twice, 
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or splitting one ’ s herd does produce higher premiums, but is that done with 
the purpose of gaining extra income? 
 Such double entries of farms became visible as a consequence of the 
development of the national Land Registry. Cross-references between data 
sets led to the conclusion that identical tracts of land had been presented for 
fi nancial support twice. By encoding the topographical maps and using these 
as counter-checks, multiple applications and misstatements about the size of 
land tracts could be easily traced. Previously, the number of hectares fi led 
for by applicants could only be compared with topographical data manually, 
this being the only way to discover inconsistencies. 
 Following the  ‘ address code ’ method, all land owned by couples was 
listed for the fi rst farm. Land that was then considered to be registered 
wrongly, with the purpose of gaining extra income, was isolated and sanc-
tions imposed. Thus, as a result of Chamber of Commerce registration, this 
task became a simple and straightforward one. 
 The application OMNIBUS was then developed in order to replace expert 
administrative decision making and administrative controls with automated 
processing. This was done by integrating the data management (databases) 
and data handling (applications) into one system. The ultimate aim was to 
slim down Teams Two and Three and assign the remainder a new task: to 
process and label raw data so that LASER ’ s applications could process the 
information and produce decisions. LASER was to become an information 
refi nery of the kind Zouridis describes ( Zouridis 2000 ). 
 ICTs and discretion 
 Here we have examples of three instances of the adoption or changes of 
use in applications and databases, with three different goals that were 
introduced into an existing administrative practice. What were the effects 
on discretion? The recovery of inconsistencies was a relatively limited op-
eration. A special team was created to compare and correct registrations. 
The operators were limited in the information sources they could use, 
having access only to the original applications and to the ways these had 
been entered into the data sets. European regulations and LASER ’ s man-
agement thinking, were clear: fi ling an application with the aim of receiv-
ing maximum fi nancial support was forbidden. Consequently, management 
imposed a tough  ‘ bottom line ’ : only the data that resulted in the lowest 
fi nancial support was selected and entered into the automatic calculus. 
Applicants protested and fi led formal objections claiming, for instance, 
that their companies really consisted of two separate economic households 
with separate administrations. Legal advisors, reviewing these objections, 
accepted many of them and ruled that each case warranted individual at-
tention. As it turned out, the managers ’ bottom line constituted a breach 
of both Dutch administrative law, such as due process, and a breach of the 
intentions behind the European regulations, which stipulated a principle 
only but left the actual implementation of that principle to the member 
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states. Legal advisors, in turn, produced new guidelines for LASER ’ s 
operators but warned that these were only guidelines. In this case, then, 
discretion was not eliminated but replaced by new discretion. The Dutch 
and European legal systems simply did not permit an elimination of sub-
stantial discretion. 
 The introduction of the Land Registry also resulted in a large number of 
applications fi led by clients that deviated in some way. Many applicants 
either misstated the number of hectares on which they were growing crops 
or claimed to have tracts of land that were not actually theirs. Consequently, 
LASER was left with the question of what to do next. In principle, fi ling a 
correct application is the applicant ’ s responsibility. Any error must result in 
a partial withholding of fi nancial support. Moreover, misstating information 
with the goal of maximizing support constitutes grounds for an administra-
tive penalty. But is misstating the number of hectares or fi ling a grant for a 
tract of land that is not one ’ s own suffi cient grounds for such a penalty? 
Again management abided by the accuracy of the data used. In this case, it 
decided that misstatements were to result in withholding grants and impos-
ing penalties. Naturally, objections were once again fi led. And, again, the 
legal system ruled that a misstatement on its own did not constitute enough 
grounds to impose a penalty. 
 Filing a correct application is clearly a complicated business. Sometimes, 
because of seasonal infl uences, an applicant can only make rough estimates 
about the number of hectares he or she tills. Moreover, as mentioned above, 
natural phenomena such as erosion can result in a growth or decline of the 
tilled area. In addition, measurement is costly and must be done by regis-
tered professionals. Administrative causes also can produce differences be-
tween offi cial registrations and the size of the crop area that applicants 
register. LASER uses topographical maps in its estimates and these are not 
always accurate. Tracts of land are divided and merged through offi cial 
deeds. In some cases,  pro bona informal contracts are made where the exclu-
sive use of an area is given to a farmer in return for non-fi nancial gains, such 
as herding cattle in natural reserves. Although the applicant is neither the 
owner nor the tenant in these cases, he does hold the exclusive right to the 
use of the land and can thus fi le for fi nancial support. So, before imposing 
a penalty and/or withholding fi nancial support, operators were instructed 
to investigate any discrepancies between the offi cial register and the applica-
tion. In essence, this implied a return to the original problem management 
was striving to solve: the use of discretion to check offi cial data. Hence, the 
introduction of the Land Registry led to a decrease of substantial discretion 
in one part of the process but created new discretion elsewhere. 
 OMNIBUS was designed to be an all-encompassing system that could 
integrate all operational procedures. Development started in early 1996. At 
the end of 1997, the system was ready for testing. A fi rst pilot was conducted 
with the so-called ewe-grants for sheep-keepers, these having the least 
complicated application procedure for stock production grants. If that 
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worked, the design of the system would be modifi ed to cover all livestock 
procedures. However, in September 1998, after the entire application pro
cedure had been completed within OMNIBUS, the system proved to be too 
rigid and was not able to account for the intricate biological aspects of farm-
ing, as outlined above. These problems jeopardized LASER ’ s intended trans-
formation into an information refi nery. Management needed OMNIBUS as 
the centrepiece of organizational renewal. If OMNIBUS, despite all the 
investments and despite promising results of the fi rst tests, was not robust 
enough to deal with the details of stock production, the transition to the new 
organization was off the agenda. In the end, the whole programme was 
abandoned. Paradoxically, management even started to promote an increased 
interaction between the developers of D&C, the operators and the members 
of the legal team. Developers and legal advisors became formally involved 
in the more tricky cases. 
 Boundary practices 
 The introduction of new applications, such as OMNIBUS, had put LASER 
on a track of departicipation: withdrawal from the factual world of its 
applicants, solely relying on its automated databases and applications. As 
mentioned above, ABS/AAS is a tool that assists operators. The core of the 
handling of applications consists of a series of human judgements. The goal 
of OMNIBUS was to replace human judgement (and ABS/AAS) with the 
mere translation of raw data into codes the application could recognize and 
form decisions upon. OMNIBUS was also thought to allow LASER to down-
scale the number of its administrative personnel and enhance the capacity 
of D&C to design work processes. 
 The opposite happened. The physical complexity of stock production 
proved too complex for an information refi nery to process. As has been said, 
to meet the high demands of the European Commission and to handle the 
gaps between the offi cial data and those provided by applicants, LASER 
operators have considerable discretion. Hence, the organization would have 
faltered had it attempted to increase standardization through OMNIBUS. 
This was recognized by both operators and legal experts. In unison, they 
opposed the impending introduction of OMNIBUS claiming OMNIBUS 
would amount to a loss of meaning. Because they spoke each other ’ s lan-
guage and took part in each other ’ s workfl ows, they succeeded in putting 
up a strong argument against the introduction of OMNIBUS, thus thwarting 
D&C ’ s plans to introduce the application. 
 Legal review played an important part in the above success. Judgements 
from the administrative courts quickly reached LASER ’ s legal team through 
the legislative department at the Ministry of Agriculture. In fact, the Ministry 
of Agriculture is little involved in policy design. Generally, LASER ’ s head-
quarters staff are responsible for translating EU amendments to the Mac 
Sharry regulations into new procedural rules. Material norms are directly 
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transferred from the EU-codes into the Dutch regulations. The design of 
lower regulations is largely seen as a matter of organizational control and 
therefore left to LASER ’ s HQ and D&C. In the case discussed, the Ministry 
of Agriculture ’ s legal department had no stake in the design of the regula-
tions therefore and harboured no reservations about allying with Team 
Three ’ s legal advisors. Yet, remarkably enough, D&C ’ s leeway did not in-
crease the use of substantial discretion by LASER ’ s operators. In situations 
that according to both the legal advisors and the operators necessitated in-
dividualized decision making, operators still continued to apply standard-
ized clauses. Faced with more responsibility than they had sought, operators 
shirked the use of discretion. 
 HIS: HOUSING SUBSIDIES 
 The programme and the organization 
 We now turn to the use of discretion in housing subsidies. The Housing 
Subsidies Act is carried out by the Dutch Section for Individual Housing 
Subsidies (HIS), a unit within the Department of Housing, Spatial Planning 
and Environmental Protection. Housing subsidies are part of what is gener-
ally considered to be the social protection function of the national govern-
ment. Rooted in the 1960s and 1970s ideology of equal treatment for house 
owners and renters, housing subsidies have developed into a major national 
scheme. Nearly one million citizens apply for them every year. 
 Tenants must apply for housing grants in order to be considered. For rent-
ers, the amount of the entitlement is calculated by subtracting income and 
 ‘ norm cost ’  – the amount that an average family of that specifi c size is ex-
pected to cover by itself  – from the actual rent. The programme allows for 
variations in regional housing markets. For instance, if low-cost housing is 
scarce in a particular area, a higher allowance may be granted. Furthermore, 
housing subsidies are used to promote goals such as non-paid family vol-
unteer aid. Applicants may house relatives in need of care and use their 
income to provide such care without losing their entitlement. The scope of 
social goals associated with housing subsidies makes the act a complicated 
programme that necessitates individualized administration on a mass basis. 
In other words, each one of the nearly 700,000 applications requires indi-
vidual review. 
 Housing subsidies are issued in advance of the actual decision; this is done 
on the basis of a provisional calculation using historical data. After a year, 
using a calculation on the basis of the actual data, HIS issues subsidies to 
individual municipalities, which in turn recalculate the rent and advances 
on the basis of that decision. This procedure leads to a relatively large num-
ber of reclaims. Until fi ve years after grants have been issued, new informa-
tion on family income and the number of residents can lead to revisions and 
subsequent reclaims. Reclaiming weighs heavily on the operational staff and 
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the image of HIS. Each year, HIS is confronted with approximately 70,000 
formal complaints because of it. 
 Handling housing subsidy applications is a complex issue. Deciding on 
the size of an entitlement requires insight into an applicant ’ s individual 
living conditions, local housing conditions, and knowledge of a complex 
piece of legislation. HIS makes about 1.2 million decisions per year. With 
about 250 operators, this amounts to 4800 decisions per operator per year. 
The only way to handle such volume is to automate the practice of the 
 Rechtsstaat . 
 Table  3 shows how we have made the domains of the Rechtsstaat opera-
tional for HIS. The operational unit HIS/C&A, with over 200 operators, is 
by far the largest. It is governed by a management team consisting of a direc-
tor and fi ve middle managers. The latter each head a regional branch that 
handles all applications and mail from that specifi c region. The regional 
branches in turn have four teams of approximately 12 operators: administra-
tive team  ‘ A ’ handles all administrative processing, while teams  ‘ B, C and 
D ’ handle all applications and mail. Moreover, each regional branch consists 
of 15  ‘ all-round ’ operators. 
 The sole job of C&A operators is to process information and render it 
manageable for automated decision making. Operators classify and encode 
qualitative information into processable numbers. Onscreen commands 
guide them through the necessary steps. The information they produce is 
then put into batches. One by one, these are compared automatically with 
the applicant ’ s existing information. Unexpected outcomes are returned as 
error codes. Operators are required to  ‘ solve ’ all error codes for a batch before 
turning to the next one. 
 C&A spans all three domains of the Rechtsstaat and represents a world on 
its own. Special  ad hoc taskforces, consisting of the branches ’ senior-opera-
tors, review operating procedures in view of recent case laws and of admin-
istrative effi ciency. The only links between C&A and the outside world are 
automated data systems. The only unit in HIS to exhibit a boundary practice 
with C&A is Policy Affairs (PA). PA prepares the annual redrafting of the 
Housing Subsidies Act, monitors jurisprudence, and counsels C&A teams on 
their internal work instructions. PA staff, in contrast to C&A staff, are highly 
specialized, well-trained and well-paid. 
 TABLE  3  Practising the  ‘ Rechtstaat ’ : HIS 
 Domain level  Design  Administration  Adaptation 
 Law HIS/PA HIS/PA Administrative courts 
 Policy HIS/PA HIS/PA HIS/PA 
 Organizational 
routines 
HIS/C&A HIS/C&A regional 
managers
HIS/C&A 
 – System Management 
 Decisions HIS/C&A
 –  Ad hoc taskforces 
HIS/C&A regional 
teams
HIS/C&A regional 
teams 
 206  FRANS JORNA AND PIETER WAGENAAR 
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007 Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 1, 2007 (189–214)
 Discretion 
 C&A is generally considered to be a  ‘ decision factory ’ : machines and systems 
are the prime substance of the organization and personnel only serve to 
operate them. Discretion is limited. According to  Schokker (1996) , in such 
organizations, not the law, but the design, is leading. Regulations are 
designed as a function of the computer ’ s algorithms. Each chapter of the law 
describes an algorithm. Details that need operationalization, such as defi ni-
tions of the norm income and household composition, are embedded in 
lower level regulations that do not need parliamentary approval; these rules 
can consequently be changed at will, as is fi tting for operating automated 
applications. 
 Processing claims for housing subsidies involves two instances of substan-
tial discretion: 
 1.  Advising on  ‘ fi tting housing conditions ’ ; 
 2.  Household income in terms of the  ‘ harshness ’ clause. 
 ‘ Fitting housing conditions ’ , referred to above, refers to the actual conditions 
on the local housing market in the regions applicants live in. As mentioned 
above,  ‘ norm rent ’ is used to calculate entitlements, but not all housing mar-
kets are the same. In some areas, the amount of affordable housing is so 
limited that applicants are forced to rent or buy well above their income 
level. HIS then covers the difference between norm rent and actual rent, 
resulting in higher allowances. HIS tries to check excessive use of housing 
subsidies by applying a  ‘ fi tting condition clause ’ . The number of  ‘ expensive 
applications ’ is limited (no municipality can compensate more than a limited 
number of such applicants); in other words, there really has to be no other 
option for these tenants. 
 For their calculations, HIS generally uses the post-tax income of household 
members. Nevertheless, strict application of this rule would result in unin-
tended  ‘ harshness ’ . Article 25 of the Housing Subsidies Act consequently 
states that  ‘ if the law results in undue harshness due to personal circum-
stances, individual adjudication should be applied ’ . Selling a privately 
owned fi rm, for instance, and using the sum earned to cover debts incurred 
does constitute a fi scal income, but only in terms of tax law. Since the returns 
have been used to repay debts, they do not actually constitute a part of the 
applicant ’ s disposable income. Counting them as income is considered 
harshness. Another case might be someone providing temporary care for ill 
parents. Although, in principle, the parents increase the household ’ s formal 
income, there is no real income: costs exceed income. Hence, here too, harsh-
ness is invoked, and HIS does not add the extra income to the household to 
the total income used to calculate the subsidy. 
 C&A management regulates substantial discretion through a combination 
of automated handling and direct supervision. Operators are guided by 
onscreen manuals that leave little room for coping with the unexpected. An 
operator can only invoke  ‘ undue harshness ’ with the explicit approval of a 
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senior. A huge gap exists between the complexity of the real world and the 
rigidity of the screen. Switching between applications, for instance, because 
a case is complicated and additional real-life data are needed, is impossible 
(as well as deemed undesirable). To help operators cope, C&A has devised 
a  ‘ work instruction ’ , a manual to guide them through the screens. Because 
the applications are updated only once a year, the work instruction is 
updated frequently. Each week, new problems and unforeseen conditions 
appear that need remedying. 
 The work of team A is discretionary on two points: 
 1.  Classifying correspondence; 
 2.  Encoding. 
 All incoming letters are classifi ed into the following four categories: 
requests for information; notifi cations of changes in an applicant ’ s personal 
data; reactions to reclaiming procedures; objections. The legal difference 
between the last two categories and the fi rst two is large. Reclaim requests 
and objections are handled as formal requests for review: to be handled 
within ten weeks. This is done on the basis of an integral review of the 
decision taken and of new information the applicant has provided. The 
amount of adminis trative work associated with such a review is substan-
tial. The law assumes that fi les for all review cases already exist. Yet, often 
such fi les are absent and, therefore, have to be constructed by the adminis-
trative team. All letters are fi led as correspondence with a relation only to 
the applicant in question. Other codes are not registered. It is therefore 
impossible to compile a fi le related to one objection since it is only possible 
to compile a fi le of all correspondence related to one client. Because an 
external criterion differentiating requests for review from correspondence 
is lacking, gauging the quality of the way HIS operators classify corres
pondence is also impossible. In a survey of reviews of 150 fi les, only 33 
were actually retrievable, and only 9 complete. Classifi cation is thus an 
inherently discretionary process. 
 Encoding involves the translation of qualitative information into quantita-
tive, numerical codes. Many items necessitate encoding: the municipal 
advice mentioned earlier, feeding new addresses into databases and decid-
ing whether these data are relocations. A double entry system ( ‘ quality 
encoding ’ ) is designed to ensure proper encoding. High work pressure, how-
ever, often undermines the quality of data entry. Consequently, data entry 
functions as a  ‘ sewage system ’ : it processes all the dirt and garbage that 
originates in other work processes, resulting in many inconsistencies. If 
teams B, C and D are under high pressure, due, for instance, to an unexpect-
edly high number of new applications, they are allowed to shift their regular 
work to team A. Under such circumstances, quality data entry operators 
perform the most routine substantive jobs. Consequently, control of data 
entry is reduced in order to allow them to fi nish the job properly. A cycle of 
high workloads and garbage processing results. 
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 Information and Communication(s) Technology (ICTs) 
 A number of computer applications are at the heart of the organization: 
 1.  Individualized Decision-making on Applications (IDA) for making 
application decisions, including reclaims; 
 2.  MegaDoc, a microfi che system that stores all correspondence; 
 3.  Location Registration, which registers all incoming and outgoing 
correspondence and assigns locations; 
 4.  LinkWorks which is used for irregular decision-making procedures that 
need tight monitoring such as review procedures. 
 IDA is not a coherent application. Rather, it consists of a set of registrations 
and applications loosely linked to each other. The registration of applicants 
is by far the largest database; it contains each applicant ’ s application history 
for the past ten years. It is coupled to a database on houses and apartments 
that contains data on rent and housing status (dependent/independent). For 
other data such as income, HIS relies on the Tax Service. Individualized 
decision making is impossible; all information is processed in batches of 
50 entities. Individual fi les do not exist. Often, each step in the decision 
processes is prepared by different operators. Checking how individual deci-
sions have been arrived at is thus impossible. Hence, when individualized 
decision making is necessary, as with reviews and grievances, the whole 
procedure is started again from scratch. All written information is put on 
microfi ches, but the extent to which this can be tracked back varies. In a 
random sample of 150 fi les which we carried out, only 33 were complete 
enough to allow analysis, complete meaning that the original application 
and decision were available. 
 Discretion and ICTs: the implementation of the General 
Administrative Law Act 
 Because ICTs constitute the core of HIS, especially of C&A, the development 
of applications and redesign of databases is a continuous process. Each year, 
the systems are marginally improved and the law is changed accordingly. In 
systems such as these, not the adoption of new systems, but the implemen-
tation of new legislation uncovers how discretion and boundary practices 
have been infl uenced by ICTs. Informatization is a core characteristic of such 
organizations. Bit by bit, operational discretion moves beyond the scope of 
managerial control. New legislative challenges are answered by attempts to 
further informatize the organization. Continual adaptation of ICTs makes 
establishing the infl uence of new systems on operational discretion diffi cult. 
However, implementing a piece of legislation that forces the agency to some-
how include operational discretion in its administrative processes forces 
management to deal with it and shows how ICTs have been infl uencing such 
discretion. For HIS, the implementation of the General Administrative Law 
Act (Awb) was such an occasion. HIS ’ management reacted by trying to curb 
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the increase in discretion through the use of ICTs. It tried to eliminate human 
discretion from the primary administrative processes whereby the organiza-
tion was transformed from a decision factory into an information refi nery. 
Accordingly, our case focuses on the interaction between ICTs and 
operational discretion during the implementation of the Awb between 
1994 and 1998. 
 The Awb contains rules of administrative law that apply to all administra-
tive procedures. The law was primarily meant to codify all generally ac-
cepted rules, and only implemented a small number of innovations. In the 
fi rst two years (1994 and 1995) the Awb was expected to have only limited 
consequences. Standard correspondence was redrafted to refl ect the Awb ’ s 
terminology, and no further adaptations were made. Nevertheless, codifi ca-
tion always implies some degree of modifi cation and is never a neutral pro-
cess. Soon after its promulgation, it became evident the Awb had a bigger 
impact on HIS than was expected. It affected HIS in a number of ways. For 
instance, the Awb ‘ s defi nitions for what constitutes a decision and a review 
suddenly increased the number of decisions HIS produced from 850,000 to 
1,000,000. Hitherto, reclaims were considered to be subject to private, not 
public, law review. The Awb changed this by rendering a public law status 
to the payment schemes that HIS offers its clients. 
 The implementation of the Awb uncovered how much discretion actually 
existed at HIS, despite its intensive use of ICTs. The most crucial one was 
with respect to the harshness clause. HIS ’ systems designers were well aware 
that their system did not provide a fully reliable representation of all social 
realities before Awb ’ s promulgation. Often, automated processing led to re-
jections whereas individual review immediately revealed the claim deserved 
granting. The harshness clause attempts to remedy such cases. However, 
internal organizational guidelines restrict the number of individual review 
cases per batch to a maximum of 4 per cent. Furthermore, each of these 
decisions is subjected to individual managerial review. The introduction 
of the Awb led to a decrease in recourse to the harshness clause, contrary 
to what the legislature had expected. The explanation for this is discretion: 
HIS ’ operators have considerable discretion in using the harshness clause. 
Since the organization insists on a limited use of the clause, the use of it 
actually decreased. 
 The Awb was designed to bolster the position of claimants in individual 
review procedures. For HIS, this meant more cases needed individual con-
sideration. In reality, the opposite happened. HIS ’ operators, in the convic-
tion that the Awb would result in a lengthier harshness clause and longer 
individual review procedures, turned away from individual review and 
started following internal automated procedures more rigidly. Consequently, 
the number of complaints and appeals increased. Using discretion, operators 
labelled these complaints  ‘ letters ’ and sent out standard responses rather 
than individualized decisions. For a long time, because the operators lacked 
boundary practices, HIS-management was unaware of this connection and 
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the reality behind the  ‘ increase in correspondence ’ . They assumed  ‘ labelling 
correspondence ’ was a low-discretionary process and that the use of the 
harshness clause was under close supervision. Yet, the  ‘ non-use ’ of the clause 
was not under supervision, and was actually a critical process. Only when 
the external law department, responsible for handling appeal procedures, 
complained about the dramatic increase in appeals and favourable legal 
rulings for the plaintiffs, did management initiate an inquiry and discover 
the underlying causes. The legal department ’ s claim was backed by the 
outcome of a  ‘ quality-survey ’ . 
 The survey learned that operators categorically labelled requests for 
review as  ‘ letters ’ , thereby blocking an applicant ’ s entry to administrative 
review procedures. Because management was so detached from operator 
practices, it had no idea of the discretion in labelling; they had deemed the 
administrative group ’ s instructions crystal clear. Management reacted to the 
situation by automating the existing organization to eliminate discretion. 
A team of highly skilled operators under the close supervision of  ‘ quality 
offi cers ’ was formed to handle the intricate cases outside the normal chan-
nels. The rest of the work processes were automated as far as possible. 
 From 2002 onwards, HIS stopped gathering  ‘ actual data ’ , instead relying 
on other agencies such as the Tax Service. The move was designed to gain 
control over the quality of incoming data by excluding the applicant as much 
as possible. Data mining became a keyword. Yet, the move had the opposite 
effect. In September 2002, the organization collapsed; due to information 
overload, it no longer possessed the capacity to gauge the quality of incom-
ing information. Furthermore, the data from other agencies proved to be 
faulty, calling into question the principle of data mining. Signalling systems 
that provide early warnings  – by virtue of allowing operators to share in the 
applicant ’ s world  – had been put out of order. As a result, hundreds of 
thousands of applicants had to wait for months until provisional grants were 
issued. The position of the incumbent minister was in jeopardy; Parliament 
and the National Audit Offi ce began inquiries, and HIS ’ senior managers 
were replaced. In the end, HIS was dismantled, and national housing subsi-
dies were integrated into income tax law. 
 CONCLUSION 
 The literature on informatization almost univocally supports the conclusion 
that shop fl oor discretion disappears under the infl uence of ICTs. Being un-
convinced by this, we formulated a rival hypothesis: instead of destroying 
operational discretion, informatization leads to an increase in inanimate arte-
facts used to control operators, which makes it impossible to see how much 
discretion operators actually use. 
 Managers using ICTs to steer and monitor what operators do limit their 
control to formal aspects of organizational life. ICTs obscure the informal use 
of discretion. Only by supplementing automated monitoring with direct 
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association and participation into operational practice, can managers gauge 
the amount of discretion actually used. We identifi ed such controls as  ‘ par-
ticipatory boundary practices ’ : links provided by human beings who act as 
interpreters between the different  ‘ practices ’ in an organization. According 
to Argyris, substituting participatory boundary practices for inanimate 
artefacts  – which is what we think the use of ICTs often leads to  – can narrow 
managerial vision to such an extent that organizations eventually run the 
risk of disintegration. 
 We put our hypothesis to the test in a comparative case study of informa-
tization processes in two organizations, the  ‘ Section for Individual Housing 
Subsidies ’ (HIS) and the  ‘ National Service for Programmes ’ (LASER). In HIS, 
participatory boundary practices were absent. The operators did not seri-
ously participate in organizational life and managers knew little about their 
operators ’ practices. The organization was mechanical; it was held together 
by MIS ’ s that only registered production facts such as the quantity of 
applications handled, the number of inconsistencies, and so on. What these 
data meant, how operators worked, what their standards were, and what 
their perceptions of other departments was, was unknown, even to middle 
management. Operational practice was absent from the mind map of most 
of the organization ’ s employees, and communicative channels were lacking. 
Direct contact between PA and C&A was limited to an absolute minimum. 
In such an environment, ICTs are perceived as a means: to gain control over 
the  terra incognita of operations; to standardize the way operators work from 
a legal-technical perspective; to root out discretion. As long as it is the ambi-
tion to somehow provide individualization, however, the opposite happens. 
Automation then leads to administrative tragedy. 
 LASER, on the other hand, was awash with boundary participation. The 
developing of regulations among the various regional units and the frag-
mentation of design and adaptation over both regional and national units, 
necessitated continuous discussion and consultation between practices. In 
this environment of intense communication, new ICTs became the object 
of confl ict and strife. But at least these quarrels were voiced in the open. 
More importantly, no one even considered having ICTs replace the exist-
ing ties between practices. Rather, ICTs were seen as a way to enhance 
communication. 
 What do these results mean in terms of our research question? We posited 
artefacts serve as linkages between practices and thus make discretion 
visible and asked ourselves whether the penetration of ICTs into organiza-
tions should thus entail a substitution of participatory boundary practices 
for artefacts with the result that discretion becomes invisible. Do these two 
case studies confi rm our hypothesis? LASER displayed remarkable resis-
tance to the introduction of new artefacts. Each effort stumbled over the 
complexities of livestock subsidies and participatory boundary practices 
actually gained in strength; that is, intensive discussions between practices 
bred recognition of each other ’ s predicaments. Operational discretion, 
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however, suffered. An increased understanding of the administrative 
complexities by non-operators led to the shirking of responsibilities by 
operators. HIS, by contrast, was characterized by a loss of participation and 
an increase of  ‘ operational rebellion ’ . Discretion fl ourished. 
 Our comparison of these two cases, then, seems to confi rm our hypothesis: 
the mere presence of artefacts does not restrain or hinder the use of discre-
tion. In fact, artefacts and discretion are mutually reinforcing. The more ar-
tefacts exist, the more practitioners succeed in maintaining their discretion. 
Discretion owes its existence to  ‘ blind spots ’ . The presence of artefacts 
increases the number of these blind spots, and thereby reinforces the existing 
monopolies over discretion. 
 In line with our hypothesis, the analysis also points to the loss of organi-
zational integration when this is solely promoted through artefacts. While 
writing this article, both organizations have been reorganized. LASER has 
 ‘ gone digital ’ . One of the livestock regulations was the fi rst to be integrated 
into a digital counter. Through this, applicants can electronically fi le their 
application, including all the necessary documents, follow the processing 
of their application online, and with a few mouse clicks alter their data. 
This has only been made possible by an integration of the work processes 
at the front offi ce through the development of a central database that stores 
all information on the size and location of tracts of land. A new bureau, 
Basic Registration, has been created to handle all data registration 
processes. This greatly relieves LASER ’ s job and has resulted in a loss of 
peripheral operational processes. Consequently, the number of operations 
has declined, as has operator discretion. LASER, in short, has witnessed 
further integration; all because management understands the way the 
organization operates. 
 HIS, on the other hand, no longer exists. The tidal wave of requests for 
review and the unanticipated consequences of isolating the operational core 
have led to its demise. Housing subsidies have subsequently been integrated 
into the tax law, and the Internal Revenue Service now administers Housing 
Grants. Generally, the individual elements associated with the harshness 
clause have been deleted. The remainder has been transferred into income 
tax administration. 
 We conclude with a fundamental observation and a dilemma. Arriving at de-
cisions tailored to the individual  – a central tenet of the social Rechtsstaat  – 
is impossible without operational discretion. This is so even for a purely pro-
cess-oriented organization such as HIS and, therefore, must apply to most 
public organizations. This leaves us two options. We can renounce our ambi-
tions to highly tailored decisions. This greatly decreases the administrative 
burden and increases effi ciency, but also relinquishes cherished ideals. Or, 
we can recognize and appreciate operational discretion, and put our trust in 
professional integrity. This consequently forces us to rely on participatory 
boundary practices instead of solely on artefacts, but leaves us with vast 
bureaucracies. 
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